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ABSTRAK 
Penganggaran yang berkaitan dengan masalah perilaku memiliki pengaruh penting pada efektivitas organisasi. 
Partisipasi anggaran umumnya mengacu pada sejauh mana bawahan berpartisipasi dalam penyusunan 
anggaran dan mempengaruhi sasaran anggaran. Tujuan penelitian ini adalah untuk menguji apakah komponen 
kontrol (ekonomi) dari keadilan prosedural memberi kontribusi yang signifikan dalam menjelaskan hubungan 
antara partisipasi anggaran dan komitmen anggaran dalam kondisi stretch budget. Mahasiswa melaksanakan 
tugas yang melibatkan keputusan penganggaran dasar. Tugas utama mereka adalah mengkode simbol sebanyak 
mungkin dalam sesi pekerjaan atas kondisi yang berbeda. Manipulasi suara, pilihan, dan jenis anggaran secara 
acak ditugaskan pada partisipan. Dua variabel dependen, judgment keadilan prosedural dan komitmen 
anggaran, diukur. Hasil penelitian menunjukkan bahwa kombinasi suara dan pilihan mempengaruhi judgment 
keadilan prosedural. Dalam kondisi stretch budget, keadilan prosedural memiliki pengaruh mediasi dalam 
hubungan antara suara dan pilihan dan komitmen anggaran. Selain itu, studi ini menemukan bahwa dalam 
kondisi stretch budget, suara dan pilihan memiliki hubungan negatif dengan komitmen anggaran, hal tersebut 
menunjukkan bahwa partisipasi anggaran menciptakan masalah perilaku. 
Kata kunci: Partisipasi anggaran, stretch budget, keadilan prosedural, komitmen anggaran 
 
ABSTRACT 
Budgeting carries behavioral problems that can have important effects on the effectiveness of an 
organization. Budgetary participation generally refers to the extent to which subordinates participate 
in preparing the budget and influence the budget goals. The purpose of this research is to investigate 
whether control (economic) components of procedural justice provide a significant contribution in 
explaining the relation between budgetary participation and budget commitment in a stretch budget 
condition.  College students perform a task involving basic budgeting decisions.  Their main job is to 
decode symbols as many as possible in a work session under different conditions. Manipulations of 
voice, choice, and budget type are randomly assigned to the participants. Two dependent variables, 
procedural justice judgments and budget commitment are measured. The results show that voice and 
choice combine to influence procedural justice judgments.  In a stretch budget condition, procedural 
justice has a mediating effect in the relations between voice and choice and budget commitment.  
Moreover, the study finds that in the stretch budget condition, voice and choice have negative 
relations with budget commitment, suggesting that budgetary participation creates a behavioral 
problem.  
Keywords: Budgetary participation, stretch budget, procedural justice, budget commitment 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In accounting area, research has placed 
heavy emphasis to the cognitive and 
behavioral effects of budgetary parti-
cipation on a wide range of dependent 
variables such as satisfaction, motivation, 
and performance (e.g. Davis et al., 2006). 
However, numerous studies have resulted 
in mixed findings on the consequences of 
budgetary participation. Shields and Young 
(1993) suggest that the effects of budgetary 
participation depend on other variables. 
They suggest the investigation of inter- 
vening variables in the relation between 
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budgetary participation and the dependent 
variables. 
Researchers realize the importance of 
procedural justice in budgetary parti- 
cipation research (e.g. Libby, 1999; 
Lindquist, 1995). Procedural justice theory 
postulates that people care at least as much 
about the procedures used in making 
allocation decisions as they do about the 
outcomes themselves (Konovsky, 2000).  
Subordinates often see hard-to-achieve 
budgets as unfair (Libby, 1999), and that 
perception leads to behavioral problems 
(Lindquist, 1995).  However, recent research 
suggests that providing people the oppor- 
tunity to participate in a budgeting decision 
process is more likely to result in over- 
coming the behavioral problems since the 
people perceive the budgeting process as 
just (Libby, 1999). Moreover, a higher 
perception of justice leads to higher indi- 
viduals’ performance.   
The participative budgeting research 
that includes procedural justice is mainly 
based upon the self-interest theory esta- 
blished by Thibaut and Walker (1975).   
This theory suggests that the distri- 
bution of control among individuals in a 
decisionmaking process is the key proce- 
dural characteristic shaping people’s proce- 
dural justice perceptions.   
The theory indicates that both voice and 
choice, which represent budgetary parti-  
cipation, enhance procedural justice judg-  
ments. Voice, the opportunity to express 
one’s views in a decision-making process, 
and choice, the opportunity to vote on the 
decision outcome, solicit individuals’ 
process and decision control perceptions, 
which lead to higher procedural justice 
judgments. Nevertheless, while the role of 
voice and choice in organizational behavior 
research is extensively confirmed, earlier 
studies in participative budgeting yield 
ambiguous results.  Lindquist (1995) finds 
that voice always enhances procedural 
justice judgments while Libby (1999) 
suggests that individuals’ procedural justice 
perceptions do not always depend upon 
voice.   
The purpose of this study is to inves- 
tigate whether two controls (economic) 
components of procedural justice, voice and 
choice, provide a significant contribution in 
explaining the relationship between budge- 
tary participation and budget commitment.  
Particularly, this study examines (1) the 
impact voice and choice on procedural  
justice judgments, and 2) whether proce- 
dural justice judgments mediate the relation 
ship between budgetary participation and 
budget commitment in a stretch budget 
condition (see Figure 1). 
This paper is organized as follows. In 
the first section, this study provide back- 
ground and synthesize previous literature.   
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Theoretical model linking budgetary participation to commitment 
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Based on this discussion, this study 
propose research hypotheses for the 
present study, followed by a discussion 
of method for testing the research 
hypotheses.  
Next, the results of the study are 
reported in the final section, I draw 
conclusions and offer suggestions for 
future research.  
 
THEORETICAL REVIEW 
Self-Interest Theory 
In their seminal work of procedural 
justice, Thibaut and Walker (1975) assert 
that interpersonal or intergroup conflicts 
over scarce resources can be resolved 
through peaceful means of conflict 
resolution.  They posit that the peaceful 
procedures must be seen as just by 
participants and observers Thibaut and 
Walker (1975) contend that. 
Procedures that vest process control 
in those affected by the outcome of the 
procedures are viewed as more fair than 
procedures that vest control in the 
decision maker.  Further, they argue that 
institutions performing procedures in a 
fair way will induce commitment and 
loyalty, which will subsequently contri-
bute to the stability of the institutions.   
Thibaut and Walker (1975) state that 
individuals are affected not only by the 
outcomes that they receive but also by 
the processes used to plan and imple- 
ment the decision.  They argue that 
procedural justice is determined by the 
structure of the decision process. The 
structural considerations include process 
control (i.e. voice) and decision control 
(i.e. choice). The former refers to whether 
people are allowed to have input into the 
process, whereas must be later refers to 
whether the individuals are enabled to 
control the actual decision made 
(Naumann and Bennett, 2000).  
Self-interest theory also asserts that 
people may be willing to take a longterm 
focus when evaluating their economic 
gains and forego immediate, shortterm 
benefits from an exchange relationship if 
they believe that advantage outcomes 
will be forthcoming in the future. 
Procedural justice is highly valued 
insofar as it suggests the existence of a 
system that will yield a desired outcome 
in the long run (Konovsky, 2000). On the 
other hand, if the procedure is perceived 
as unfair, individuals will not have 
assurance about their longterm benefits. 
This may lead people to believe that the 
outcome is unpredictable, if not, at worst, 
negative. As a consequence, the indi- 
viduals will care mostly about short-term 
outcomes. Empirical research supports 
this model, suggesting that individuals 
value procedural justice for self-interest 
reasons (Derfuss, 2008). 
Participation in Budgeting 
Budgetary participation generally 
refers to the extent to which subordinates 
participate in preparing the budget and 
influence the budget goals (Kenis, 1979; 
Milani, 1975).  Milani (1975) argues that 
the amount of subordinate participation 
in decision-making can be viewed as a 
continuum ranging from no subordinate 
influence to a complete subordinate 
influence. 
Theoretical models and empirical 
research about participation in decision-
making suggest that an increased parti- 
cipation is preferable to less. Employing 
the Vroom-Yetton model, some research 
evaluate the appropriateness of parti- 
cipative styles in a budgeting decision. 
The findings support the importance of 
participation in the budgetary process 
and confirm a general rule, which 
recommends only high levels of parti- 
cipation to ensure the success of the 
decision process.   
If the amount of participation is the 
sole determinant of the success of parti-
cipative budgeting, then the type of 
participation that only gives sub- 
ordinates the opportunity to provide 
input whereas the final say belongs to 
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superiors (i.e.voice) will not ensure 
budgetary participation effectiveness. In 
other words, choice, the opportunity to 
vote the final decision, which entails 
decision control is always better than 
voice (which entails process control).   
Nonetheless, research in procedural 
justice provides convincing evidence that 
there is a strong preference for proce- 
dures permitting voice over procedures 
providing no voice (Vermunt et al., 2001). 
When voice is provided to decision-
making participants, this seems to satisfy 
participants’ preferences for some mea- 
sures of control. Voice works even when 
individuals making the judgments do not 
have direct control over the decision 
itself (Lind et al., 1990).  
Procedural Justice Judgments 
Research finds that process control 
and decision control enhance indi- 
viduals’ procedural fairness perceptions. 
Subsequent research findings show that 
procedures allowing voice and choice 
have positive effects on individuals’ 
procedural justice judgments (Lind et al., 
1990; Lindquist, 1995). In the current 
study, individuals work in a budgeting 
process that give (or do not) them a voice 
or choice opportunity. Self interest theory 
and previous empirical findings lead to 
the hypotheses that individuals who 
have a voice or choice opportunity in the 
budgeting process will perceive higher 
procedural justice regarding the process 
than those who do not have either 
opportunity. 
Budget Commitment  
The current study measures proce- 
dural justice judgments before a stretch 
budget decision takes effect. Acting as 
sub- ordinates in the budgeting process, 
the individuals are expected to exhibit 
dissatisfaction of the process when the 
stretch budget is enacted. The study 
expects a decrease in the procedural 
justice perception level once the 
subordinates realize that the budgeting 
process does not produce satisfactory 
outcomes. Prior research suggests that 
providing participation  opportunity  to  
sub ordinates   in a decision process 
increases budget commitment (Nouri 
and Parker, 1998).  However, as sugges- 
ted by referent cognition theory, when 
the final budget turns out to be difficult 
to achieve, then the subordinates will not 
value the participation opportunity as 
much as they did. Therefore, the current 
study hypothesizes that in a stretch 
budget condition, voice and choice will 
have negative relations with budget 
commitment.  
Referent cognition theory suggests 
that the decision of administering a 
stretch budget will lower procedural 
justice judgments which were initially 
high. Additionally, prior research sug- 
gests that when subordinates learn that 
their initial procedural justice judgments 
do not positively relate to favorable 
outcomes, they will be frustrated and 
disappointed (Lindquist, 1995). The 
theory and prior research suggests that in 
the stretch budget condition, procedural 
justice judgments will have a negative 
relation with budget commitment. 
Lindquist (1995) argue that parti-  
cipation in goal setting increases goal 
acceptance by increasing an individual’s 
feelings of control over the goal setting 
process. Tyler and Degoey (1996) find 
that inferences about the trustworthiness 
of authorities have a powerful effect on 
individuals’ willingness to accept deci- 
sions. Parallel with the research findings 
concerning the relations between parti- 
cipateon and procedural justice judg-  
ments, and procedural justice judgments 
and organizational commitment (Fisher 
et al., 2002; Folger and Konovsky, 1989; 
Tyler and Degoey, 1996), and founded by 
self-interest theory, the current study 
expects that procedural justice judgments 
mediate the effects of voice and choice on 
budget commitment. 
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Procedural Justice Judgments 
The study investigates the effects of 
procedural justice separately from those 
of distributive justice.  Nouri and Parker 
(1998) argue that the effects of voice and 
choice should not depend on distributive 
justice effects. Therefore, procedural 
justice judgments should have already 
existed before a decision (i.e. the budget) 
is set. Individuals who are given voice 
and choice opportunity have perceived 
fairness effects despite the nature of the 
budget. Accordingly, in this study, I 
measure the procedural justice judg- 
ments before the budget is determined. 
Despite the controversy between 
traditional participation research and the 
extant literature in budgeting that 
considers procedural  justice (Lindquist, 
1995; Libby, 1999; Fisher et al., 2002), 
both streams of research agree on the 
importance of voice and choice. Self-
interest theory suggests that providing    
voice and/or choice opportunity 
provides individuals with a sense of 
control of the budgeting process and/or 
the final decision. In turn, higher process 
and decision control perceptions lead to 
higher level of procedural justice 
judgments (Lindquist, 1995; Libby, 1999). 
The self-interest theory and empi- 
rical findings discussed above lead to the 
following hypotheses: 
H1a: Individuals who have a voice oppor- 
tunity in the budgeting process will 
perceive higher procedural justice 
regarding the process than those 
who do not have the opportunity 
H1b: Individuals who have a choice 
opportunity in the budgeting pro- 
cess will perceive higher procedu- 
ral justice regarding the process than 
those who do not have the 
opportunity 
Brett and Goldberg (1983) state that 
choice has more influence on procedural 
justice perceptions than voice does, 
arguing that because choice is a more 
certain and more direct form of personal 
control over decision outcomes. Brett and 
Goldberg’s study  find that higher levels 
of participation ensure the success of a 
decision process. However, Lindquist 
(1995) finds that choice  is only effective 
in a favorable decision outcome (fair 
budget) condition, while voice works 
more effective in an unfair budget 
condition.  
Both Brett and Goldberg’s (1983) and 
Lindquist’s (1995) studies indicate that 
choice is the stronger determinant of 
perceived procedural justice than voice.  
However, when an opportunity for voice 
occurs in a decision-making process, 
there may be some improvement of 
procedural justice perceptions beyond 
that produced by choice.  Procedural 
justice theory predicts that individuals 
will be more satisfied with a decision 
outcome as well as the decision 
procedures when given the opportunity 
to present information to the decision 
maker because the opportunity promotes 
their self-interest (Kwong and Leung, 
2002).  
The voice opportunity can have 
value added when the individuals have 
the choice opportunity.  This is because 
voice has the power to convey the 
reasons behind the choice and thus 
provides a finer control over the decision 
outcome. On the other hand, giving the 
individuals choice opportunity in addi- 
tion to voice opportunity can enhance 
their procedural fairness judgments since 
choice can increase the individuals’ sense 
of power (Brett and Goldberg, 1983). 
Based on this line of reasoning, choice or 
voice alone can be seen as achieving less 
control over the outcome than the 
combination of voice and choice. 
H1c: The combination of subordinate 
voice and choice in the budgeting 
process will positively affect 
procedural justice judgments. 
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Stretch Budget and Budget Commit- 
ment 
The current study measures proce- 
dural justice judgments before the deci- 
sion of the budgeting process is given to 
the subordinates. I expect a change in the 
justice perception level once the sub- 
ordinates realize that the budgeting 
process does not produce satisfactory 
outcomes (Masterson, 2001; Stevens, 
2002). The enactment of a stretch budget 
as the final budget is indicated to 
stimulate subordinates' dissatisfaction on 
the budgeting  process.   
When participation is solicited from 
the subordinates in the budgeting pro- 
cess, the subordinates will expect that the 
final budget will benefit them. If the 
budget turns out to be difficult to 
achieve, then the subordinates will not 
value the participation opportunity as 
much as they did. Moreover, participa- 
tion opportunity has a frustration effect 
in the  case of an unfavorable decision 
outcome.  The effect occurs when the 
subordinates eventually learn that their 
participation  does not affect the decision 
outcome. The subordinates are dis-  
appointed and frustrated because their 
expectation regarding the decision out- 
come is not met. The frustration and 
disappointment can hurt their commit- 
ment with the decision outcome (i.e. the 
final budget). The line of reasoning leads 
to the following hypotheses. 
H2a: In a stretch budget condition, voice 
opportunity in the budgeting pro- 
cess will have a negative relation 
with budget commitment 
H2b: In a stretch budget condition, 
choice opportunity in the bud- 
geting process will have a negative 
relation with budget commitment 
The following hypothesis deals with 
the relation between procedural justice 
judgments and budget commitment. The 
argument for the hypothesis is parallel 
with those of the hypotheses 2a and 2b, 
since those hypotheses cover the rela- 
tions between the determinants of 
procedural justice and budget commit 
ment. Fairness heuristic theory (Lind et 
al., 2001) suggests that the subordinates 
will use their procedural justice judg- 
ments as cognitive shortcuts to arrive at 
decisions about the extent to which they 
commit to the final budget. The theory 
predicts that when subordinates perceive 
fairness in budgeting procedures as the   
result of having control, they will 
perceive themselves as having more 
investments in the organization. Confi-
dence that in the long run their interests 
will be recognized through the budgeting 
process motivates the subordinates to 
comply with the final budget. 
In the stretch budget condition, the 
subordinates face the reality that their     
initial procedural fairness judgments do      
not positively correlate with the outcome 
favorability. Given that the subordinates 
are goal-seeking individuals, the receipt 
of the stretch budget decision threatens 
their goal attainment (Fuller and Jensen, 
2010). When making sense of the unfair 
budget, the subordinates seek to under- 
stand the causes.  Research shows that 
people given a relatively clear expla- 
nation regarding an unfavorable out- 
come demonstrate greater organi- 
zational commitment (Brockner et al., 
1997, 2000). However, since the sub-  
ordinates in the current study will not 
find any explanation, it is reasonable to 
expect that they will adjust their 
procedural justice judgments to a lower 
level. Brockner et al. (1992) find that 
citizens who initially have higher trust in 
authorities demonstrate a very sharp 
decline in subsequent trust after they 
perceive that their trust has been violated 
(a contrast effect). Lindquist (1995) find 
that when unfair budgets are imposed to 
subjects who previously have a choice 
opportunity, the subjects are less satisfied 
with the budgets and tasks.   
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An important implication of this 
reasoning is that the receipt of the unfair 
budget elicits the adjustment process of 
procedural justice judgments. The final 
budget will not receive as much 
commitment as it used to when the 
procedural fairness judgments decline. 
H3: In a stretch budget condition, 
procedural justice judgments will 
have a negative relation with budget 
commitment. 
Parallel with the research findings 
concerning the relations between 
participation and procedural justice 
judgments, and procedural justice 
judgments and organizational commit-
ment (Fisher et al., 2002; Folger and 
Konovsky, 1989; Tyler and Degoey, 
1996), the current study proposes that the 
effects of voice and choice on budget 
commitment may operate through 
procedural justice perceptions.  Fisher et 
al. (2002) argue that participation in goal 
setting increases goal acceptance by 
increasing an individual’s feelings of 
control over the goal setting process. 
The current study investigates 
whether procedural justice judgments 
mediate the effects of subordinates’ 
possession of voice and choice on budget 
commitment. The study examines not 
only differences in budget commitment 
means resulting from manipulations of 
voice and choice but also the covariance 
structure of perceived procedural justice 
and budget commitment measures. The 
study proposes a finer explanation to the 
relation between budgetary participation 
and budget commitment beyond prior 
research findings (Poon et al., 2001; Lilis 
and Mundy, 2005). 
Prior studies show that providing a 
partici-pation opportunity (i.e. voice and 
choice) in a budgeting process gives 
individuals a sense of control of the 
process and the final decision, which 
leads to higher perceived procedural 
fairness (e.g. Lindquist, 1995).  Provided 
with voice and choice conditions, 
subordinates should judge the budgeting 
process fairness as high. They will expect 
the final budget to be able to provide 
them with the highest benefit possible 
given a specific reward system (Jensen, 
2001). However, if the final budget 
determined by the superior is likely to be 
unachievable or unfair (i.e. stretch 
budget), the subordinates will res- 
crutinize the budgeting procedures. The 
subordinates will perceive that the 
budgeting process fails to fulfill their 
expectations.  In this situation, they begin 
to realize that they do not really have the 
control power in the budgeting process, 
and thus, their process and decision 
control become unrealistic.   
Referent cognition theory suggests 
that the unmet expectation can transform 
subordinaes’ initial high procedural 
justice judgments into negative effects on 
their commitment to the final budget. 
The subordinates will believe that the 
superior should have acted differently in 
the process so that the budget would 
have been more favorable to the 
subordinates (See, 2009). Stated different-  
ly, subordinates who have voice and 
choice conditions are the ones who suffer 
the most when the stretch budget is set. 
Based on the arguments, this study offer 
the following hypotheses:  
H4a: Given the stretch budget decision, 
the procedural justice judgments 
will mediate the negative effect of 
voice on budget commitment 
H4b: Individuals Given the stretch 
budget decision, the procedural 
justice judgments will mediate the 
negative effect of choice on budget 
commitment 
 
RESEARCH METHOD 
Subjects 
The study uses college students as its 
subjects. The students were invited to 
participate in the study and were offered 
a partial credit in courses and an 
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opportunity to win one of four two 
hundred dollar cash prizes. Two 
hundred and twenty students were 
invited to the study through Research 
Experience Program (REP) administered 
by Gatton College of Business and 
Economics, University of Kentucky. The 
use of the student subjects is considered 
appropriate since the experimental task 
involves symbol decoding activities and 
basic budgeting decisions, which the 
students can learn in a few minutes.   
Design 
The study employs a laboratory 
experiment because of the clarity of 
causal inference gained by being able to 
manipulate antecedents to perceptions of 
control and procedural justice. It is 
important since the study attempts to 
highlight a critical link between the 
budgetary participation and procedural 
justice literature. 
The study employs a 2 X 2 between-  
subjects experimental design. The 
independent variables are the types of 
budgetary participation: voice and 
choice. Voice is manipulated by giving 
the participants an opportunity to 
express their thoughts about the initial 
(150-symbol) final budget that the 
supervisor wanted to assign. Choice is 
manipulated by providing the 
participants a right to vote for the final 
budget.   
Two dependent variables are mea-
sured in the study. I measure procedural 
justice judgments using a 5-point scale 
for which the participants respond to a 
question asking how fair procedure is 
used to determine the final budget (Lind 
et al., 1990; Libby, 1999). The subjects’ 
commitment to the budget is measured 
by a measure developed by Klein et al. 
(2001).    
Materials and Procedures 
The participants sign up to the study 
at   a website maintained by the Research 
Experience Program. The website 
informs the participants regarding 
appointment date and time, the study 
location, as well as general instructions. 
There are multiple appointment dates 
available to accommodate different 
participants’ convenience. Sixteen ver- 
sions of study material were randomly 
distributed to the participants. The 
experiment required approximately 45 
minutes to complete. The case study was 
developed based on that of Libby (1999). 
I did two pilot tests with two different 
types of audience, doctoral students and 
faculty, and college students. In the case 
study, the participants act as sub- 
ordinates in a budgeting process and the 
researcher acts as their superior. The 
subjects’ main job is to decode a number 
of symbols under the supervision of the 
superior. The superior tells the sub- 
ordinates that they get paid in raffle 
tickets. The tickets are used to determine 
four US$200 cash prize winners.  The 
number of tickets that the subjects can 
earn depends on their performing a 
simple task quickly and accurately. 
Following a measurement of the 
subjects’ self-esteem, this study explain-  
ed the reward scheme and conducted 
two three minute practice sessions. Then, 
the manipulations were administered 
after the subjects learn that the tentative 
budget was set at 150 correctly-decoded 
symbols. The compensation scheme is 
represented in a formula: P = F + AX, 
where P = total payment, F = a number 
of raffle tickets as fixed payment 
regardless of the number of items 
correctly decoded, and X = the difference 
between actual number of symbols 
correctly decoded and the final budget. 
To make sure that the subjects 
understood the reward scheme, multiple 
tests were administered with numerical 
examples.  Following this, manipulation 
checks for voice and choice were made 
and the participants’ procedural justice 
judgments were measured. 
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Then, a final budget was set. The 
final budget was highly unattainable 
(stretch budget) to motivate the subjects 
to rethink their initial procedural fairness 
perceptions. Finally, after measuring 
subjects’ budget commitment and 
checking on the  budget  type   manipula-  
tion, the subjects were debriefed. 
 
ANALYSES AND DISCUSSION 
Manipulation Checks 
Manipulation checks are conducted 
to ensure  that    participants   perceive    
the strength of the voice and choice 
manipulations   as  intended  in  the    
research instrument. The study employs 
5-point Likert-type scales  to measure 
indicate a mean (standard deviation) 
process control of 4.16 (0.85), compared 
with 3.24 (1.35) for no-voice condition. 
The difference in mean is statistically 
significant at p<0.01 (t=6.03; 1-tail). For 
choice manipulation, the participants 
assess the decision control at 3.01 (0.99) 
and 2.72 (0.96) for the choice and no-
choice conditions respectively. The 
difference in mean is statistically 
significant at p<0.05 (t=2.25; 1-tail).   
Procedural Justice Judgments 
This study expect that individuals’ 
procedural justice judgments (PJJ) will be 
significantly affected by voice (H1a), 
choice (H1b), and by the interactions 
among the conditions (H1c).   
Table 1 presents the results of 
analysis of variance for PJJ. The analysis 
reveals significant main effects of voice (F 
= 22.71, p < 0.01) and choice (F = 26.63, p 
< 0.01) on the measure of procedural 
justice, supporting 
Hypotheses 1a and 1b.  The results 
also show significant interaction effects 
of voice and choice (F = 14.58, p < 0.01), 
providing support for Hypothesis 1c. 
Budget Commitment 
The next hypotheses posit that in a 
stretch budget condition, voice (H2a) and 
choice (H2b) will be negatively related to 
budget commitment. Hypothesis 3 
predicts that procedural justice judg- 
ments and budget commitment will have 
a significant negative relationship.  The 
subsequent hypotheses predict that 
procedural justice judgments will 
mediate the relationships between voice 
(H4a) and choice (H4b) and budget 
commitment.    
Path analysis is used to test the 
proposed hypotheses. Path analysis 
entails the use of multiple regressions in 
relation to explicitly formulated causal 
models. The analysis provides the tests of 
linkages in the models. The path model
 
Table 1 
Analysis of Variance for Procedural Justice Judgments 
Source Type III Sum of 
Squares 
 
Df 
Mean 
Square 
 
F 
 
p-value 
Model 70.88 3 10.13 15.27 .00 
Intercept 
V 
C 
V*C 
Error 
Total 
2922.65 
15.06 
17.66 
9.67 
140.55 
3157.00 
1 
1 
1 
1 
216 
220 
2922.65 
15.06 
17.66 
9.67 
.66 
4408.35 
22.71 
26.63 
14.58 
.00 
.00 
.00 
.00 
Note: 
R2  = .335; V= voice; C= choice 
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used in the analysis corresponds to the 
theoretical model in Figure 1.   
In Figure 1, each link between the 
variables has a path coefficient that 
provides a quantitative estimate of the 
direct causal connections between the 
variables. Figure 2 presents the path 
model that makes explicit the likely 
causal linkages between variables in this 
study. 
The model proposes that each 
exogenous variable (voice or choice) has 
a direct effect on budget commitment (p1 
and p2, respectively).  The model also 
proposes indirect effects of the exo- 
genous variables on budget commitment 
(BC) through procedural justice judg- 
ments (PJJ).  Voice affects PJJ (p3), and 
choice affects PJJ (p4) which in turn 
affects BC (p5). 
In addition, there is some amount of 
unexplained variance for each endo- 
genous variable. In the model, e1 refers to 
the amount of variance in PJJ that is not 
accounted for by voice and choice; e2 
denotes the amount of error arising from 
the variance in BC that is not explained 
by V, C, and PJJ.   
 
                                                        p1                                                                             
                                                        p2 
                                                                                                          
                                         p3 
                            p4                                        p5                                     e1 
                                                                                                                                                                                       
                                                      
Figure 2 
Path Model 
  
       
V 
C 
BC 
PJJ 
 e2 
Note: V   = voice 
           C    = choice 
           PJJ  = procedural justice judgments 
           BC  = budget commitment 
 
   
Table 2  
Path Analysis Results – Stretch Budget Condition 
 
Dependent 
Variables 
Independent 
Variables 
Associated 
Hypothesis 
Path 
Coefficients 
t-value p-value R2 
 
PJJ 
 
BC 
 
 
 
V 
C 
V 
C 
PJJ 
 
 
 
H2a 
H2b 
H3 
 
0.25 
0.30 
-0.13 
-0.17 
0.24 
 
2.83 
3.39 
-1.33 
-1.71 
2.27 
 
0.00 
0.00 
0.09 
0.04 
0.01 
 
0.20 
0.20 
0.08 
0.08 
0.08 
Note: 
V = voice; C= choice; PJJ = procedural justice judgments; BC= budget commitment 
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Values for path coefficients are 
estimated using regression and correla- 
tion analysis.  The path coefficient is the 
standardized regression coefficient. 
Computation using SPSS to complete all 
of the paths results in path coefficients as 
displayed in Table 2.  Based on table 2, 
the complete structural equations for the 
three endogenous variables are: 
(1) PJJ = 0.25 V + 0.30 C + 0.90 
(2) BC = -0.13V – 0.17 C + 0.24 PJJ + 0.96 
Figure 3 illustrates the path 
coefficients in the path model with 
significant path coefficients shown in 
bold. Path coefficients of PJJ/V and 
PJJ/C are all significant at p < 0.01. Path 
coefficients of BC/C and BC/PJJ are 
significant at p< 0.05 while path BC/V is 
moderately significant (p < 0.1). 
The results in Table 2 (illustrated in 
figure 3) indicate that voice and choice 
affects PJJ directly. This is consistent with 
the findings of the previous analysis of 
variance (for Hypotheses 1 & 2). 
The results show that path BC/V has 
a moderately significant coefficient and 
therefore hypothesis 2a is partially 
supported. Path coefficient of BC/C is 
significant and, thus, providing support 
for hypotheses 2b. In short, there are 
direct negative relationships between 
voice and BC and between choice and 
BC. 
The path analysis finds an interes- 
ting result regarding hypothesis 3. The 
path coefficient of BC/PJJ is significant 
but in the opposite direction. The result 
indicates a significant positive relation 
between PJJ and BC, while it is predicted 
that a negative relation will occur.  
Therefore, the data do not provide 
support for hypothesis 3. 
                                                                                                                              
                                                                  
                                      -0.13c                                                                      
                                   -0.17b                                                         
                            0.25a 
        0.30a                                                                                   
                                                                     0.24b                                      
                                                                                                     
 
Figure 3 
 Path Coefficients – Stretch Budget Condition 
Note: 
a significant at the 0.01 level 
b significant at the 0.05 level 
c significant at the 0.10 level 
V = voice  
C = choice 
PJJ = procedural justice judgments 
BC = budget commitment 
V 
C BC 
PJJ 
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Table 3 
The Decomposition of Path Analysis Model Relationships 
Paths Total 
Effect(r) 
EffectCoef
ficients 
Direct Effect 
(Path Coeff.) 
Indirect 
Effect 
Spurious 
Effect 
Unanalyze
d Effect 
Voice  PJJ 
Voice  BC 
Choice  PJJ 
Choice  BC 
PJJ  BC 
 
0.25 
-0.07 
0.30 
-0.10 
0.12 
 
0.25 
-0.07 
0.30 
-0.10 
0.24 
 
0.25 
-0.13 
0.30 
-0.17 
0.24 
 
-- 
0.06 
-- 
0.07 
-- 
 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-- 
-0.12 
 
0.006 
-0.001 
0.001 
-0.001 
-- 
Note:V = voice; C= choice; PJJ = procedural justice judgments; BC= budget commitment 
 
Table 4 
Analysis of Indirect Effects – Stretch Budget Condition 
Indirect Effect Indirect Effect 
Coefficientsa 
Standard Deviation 
of Coefficient 
t-values 
V on BC (via PJJ) 
C on BC (via PJJ) 
0.09 
0.11 
0.05 
0.06 
1.77b 
1.89b 
 
Note: 
a Indirect effect coefficients are calculated using unstandardized path coefficients.  
b t-value is statistically significant at p < 0.05 
V = voice 
C = choice 
PJJ = procedural justice judgments 
BC = budget commitment 
 
Hypotheses 4 posit that the indirect 
effects of voice (H4a) and choice (H4b) on 
BC through PJJ will be significant.  In 
other words, the hypotheses predict that 
PJJ will serve as a mediator in the 
relationships between the exogenous 
variables and BC. Figure 3 suggests that 
each of the exogenous variables affect BC 
directly and indirectly via PJJ.   
To examine the relative magnitude 
of each type of effects, the total effects are 
decomposed. Table 3 presents the 
decomposition of the model relation- 
ships. Basically, a correlation coefficient 
can be decomposed into the following 
components: direct effect (DE), indirect 
effect (IE), unanalyzed effect (U) due to 
correlated cause(s), and spurious effect 
(S) due to common cause (Pedhazur, 
1982). Effect coefficients (EC) are 
obtained by adding the DE and the IE. 
Since the model under consideration is 
relatively complex. This study use the 
method for the calculation of EC and IE 
developed (Fox in Kwong and Leung, 
2002).   
Kwong and Leung (2002) argue that 
a variable functions as a mediator when 
(1) an independent variable significantly 
affects the mediating variable, (2) the 
independent variable has a significant 
relation with the dependent variable, (3) 
the mediating variable is significantly 
related to the dependent variable, and (4) 
the relationship between independent 
variable and dependent variable decrea- 
ses after controlling for the mediating 
variable. Also, (5) the independent vari- 
able should have significant correlations 
with the mediating variable.  With regard 
to hypotheses 4a and 4b, the results 
suggest that the conditions are fulfilled. 
44     Ekuitas: Jurnal Ekonomi dan Keuangan – Volume 16, Nomor 1, Maret 2012 : 32-47 
Further analyses regarding the signi-  
ficance of the indirect effects of voice and 
choice on BC via PJJ do support the 
hypotheses (table 4). Table 4 displays the 
results of the analysis of indirect effects. 
To assess the significance of the indirect 
effects, their standard deviations were 
estimated using the methods of Sobel.  
Table 4 shows that the indirect effects of 
voice and choice are significant at p < 
0.05 (t-values are 1.77 and 1.89, 
respectively;  1-tail tests). 
In conclusion PJJ does function as 
the mediator in the relationships between 
the exogenous variables and BC. 
 
CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION 
The study provides support to self-
interest theory. The results indicate that 
the theory is reasonably accurate and 
that the subordinates consider their self-
interests in judging procedural fairness.   
The study is consistent with previous 
studies indicating that procedural justice 
judgments affect individuals’ behavior in 
a budgeting process (Lindquist, 1995; 
Libby, 1999; Fisher et al., 2002). In 
addition, the study asserts that procedu- 
ral justice judgments can exist regardless 
of the fairness of the budget, supporting 
the extant justice literature. 
The study suggests that voice and 
choice can lead to frustration effects 
when the subordinates learn that their 
participation does not affect the final 
budget. Frustrated subordinates reassess 
their procedural justice judgments and 
subsequently lower their budget commit- 
ment. This implies that procedural justice 
is as important as outcome fairness, and 
therefore, managers should attend to 
procedural justice issues as early as pos- 
sible in the budgeting process, especially 
in a stretch budget condition. 
Managing procedural justice percep- 
tions effectively can decrease the eco- 
nomic costs and therefore, increase the 
efficiency and effectiveness of a bud- 
geting process. 
The current study contributes to the 
literature in several ways. The study 
extends those of Libby (1999) and 
Lindquist (1995) by presenting evidence 
regarding process fairness perceptions 
independent from outcome justice judg- 
ments. The results, when considered 
with the other studies, suggest that 
individuals rely intensively on voice and 
choice judge procedural justice. Never- 
theless, the study still portrays the role of 
outcome justice judgments in a particular 
condition.  
Finally, using a stretch budget condi- 
tion, the study offers some empirical 
evidence regarding behavioral problems 
that stretch budget principle carries. 
Nonetheless, the results offer some 
possibilities for reducing the problems. 
As in any empirical studies, there are 
limitations associated with this study 
that should be identified.  
The limitations are discussed as 
areas that may be fruitful for future 
research. First, the sample was from a 
pool of relatively homogenous college 
students, which may limit the external 
validity of the findings. The results may 
not be generalizable to organizations that 
differ significantly from the subject pool.   
In the future, researchers may ad- 
dress the effect of demographic variables, 
which traditionally are treated as control 
variables. For instance, organizational 
tenure may result in various responses 
regarding procedural fairness. The 
longer the tenure individuals have with 
an organization, the more likely they are 
more attached to the organization. In 
turn, they will tend to perceive higher 
justice.  
Second, in this study I did not 
examine the order of presentation of the 
two types of justice and their nature. In 
reality, people might be affected by 
primary or recency bias in perceiving 
fairness. For example, in companies 
outside the laboratory setting, employees 
receive mixed information regarding 
                                                             Budgetary Participation And Stretch Targets… -  Nahartyo      45 
 
justice, sometimes favorable and some- 
times unfavorable, with random order of 
types of justice presentation, sometimes 
procedural fairness information follo- 
wing distributive justice information or 
otherwise. As a possible result, sub- 
ordinates may be directed to depend on 
the history of justice they experienced in 
the past instead of on the recent 
information. This possibility warrants 
future research. 
Third, the study defines stretch 
budget as  an unfair budget. It is possible 
that the participants might not have 
believed that stretch budget is similar to 
an unfair budget.  They may see a stretch 
budget as a challenging goal that moti- 
vates them to perform better.  The belief 
could have led to reduced power in the 
test of the coefficients in the relation 
between procedural justice judgments 
and performance.  Future research can be 
prompted to investigate the effects of 
stretch budget on justice perception. 
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